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In this paper, we evaluate if the demand for democracy affects the actual level of democracy. The 
analysis is based on the World Values Survey and Worldwide Governance Indicators data and is applied 
to a sample of 70 countries. We focus on the dynamics of the level of democracy within the individual 
countries, and not on cross-country differences. We find that in the short run, agents’ attitudes towards 
democracy are negatively correlated with the actual level of democracy. This finding may be explained 
by crackdowns initiated by authoritarian governments for their self-preservation. Future levels of 
democracy can be predicted by the agents’ demand for an authoritarian leader unhindered by a 
parliament or elections. Transformations, however, are far from immediate. Our estimations suggest 
that the time-lag between a decline in the demand for an authoritarian leader and an increase in the 
level of democracy is around six years. An additional finding is that a greater dependence on oil 
revenues is associated with a lower democracy level. 
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Economic literature suggests that democracy does not have a direct impact on economic 
growth; however, democratic societies increase human capital, political stability and economic 
freedom, and reduce inflation (Doucouliagos & Ulubaşoğlu 2008). Democratic governments are 
more predictable (Ezrow & Frantz 2011). They provide more public goods to their citizens and 
are characterized by a higher level of social inclusion (Deacon 2003). In democratic countries 
inequality is lower than in those under authoritarian regimes (Muller 1988, Glaeser 2005). In 
democracies people are healthier and, at least some time after the transition to democracy, 
their life expectancy increases (Franco et al. 2004, Mackenbach et al. 2013) and infant mortality 
falls (Navia & Zweifel 2003). In general, living in democracies makes people more satisfied with 
their lives (Orviska 2014, Owen et al. 2008). Clearly, transitions to democracy have important 
implications for the wellbeing of populations. In a number of countries there are evident trends 
towards democratization (Lynch & Crawford 2011, Schenoni & Mainwaring 2019). At the same 
time, in many democratic countries a wave of populism is challenging liberal democratic 
institutions (Galston 2018, Waisbord 2018, Lührmann & Lindberg 2019, Cassani & Tomini 2020).  
This raises the question: If the population of a country demands more democracy, does this, in 
fact, lead to democratization? Are changes immediate or do they only occur after a lag? If the 
demand for populist or authoritarian leaders grows, should we expect to see a decline in the 
level of democracy? Our paper aims to answer these questions. To measure the demand for 
democracy, we utilize World Values Survey (WVS) questions regarding respondents’ sentiments 
towards democracy and authoritarian leaders. We compare replies to these questions with the 
actual level of democracy measured by `Voice & Accountability’, as provided by Worldwide 
Governance Indicators. Our estimates suggest that agents’ sentiments towards democracy are 
negatively related to the observed level of democracy in the short run. It is likely that in 
countries with an authoritarian regime an increase in the demand for democracy leads to 
greater repression. In democratic countries, declines in the demand for democracy may lead to 
even more freedom. Such responses in both types of regimes can be explained by the desire for 
self-preservation, in that, as societal support declines, they aim to transmit their plan of action 
to future generations. 
In the longer-run, the level of democracy can be forecasted by the demand for an authoritarian 
leader. A decline in the demand for authoritarianism does not lead to an immediate change in 
the level of democracy. It follows, instead, after a 6-year lag. We argue that due to large 
intervals between the waves in the WVS, the actual lag may be even larger. 
There is extensive literature on the causes of democratization. It is often argued that 
democracy is more likely in economically developed countries (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck 1994, 
Barro 1999, Geddes 1999, Vanhanen 2004). Vanhanen explains that in developed countries 
multiple interest groups control enterprises and the means of production. However, democratic 
transition is more likely in periods of economic decline (Geddes 1999). In fact, military regimes 
are less resistant to economic crises. Personalist regimes are more resilient to economic decline 
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than military regimes. Single-party authoritarian regimes are the most resilient to economic 
declines.  
It is often found that political regimes in petroleum-producing countries are more stable. 
Therefore, petroleum production in authoritarian regimes makes democratization less likely 
(Barro 1999, Ross 2001, Morrison 2007, Colgan 2015, Write et al. 2015) but it encourages   
democratic survival in the presence of a democratic regime (Gurses 2011). However, Gurses 
(2009) argues that if rents from oil production are invested in public education and economic 
development, oil-producing countries may tend towards the democratic.  
Cultural aspects also matter. There is evidence that Muslim counties are less likely to become 
democratic (Barro 1999, Fish 2002). Barro 1999 also reported a negative impact of the non-
religious population on democratization. There is also evidence that a British colonial heritage 
contributes to better prospects for democracy (Weiner 1987). 
Democratization was also studied from a `demand’ perspective. Welzel and Inglehart (2008) 
argued that democracy does not emerge because elites adopt democracy in a vacuum, but 
rather, a well-organized and well-motivated demand for democracy limits the choice for the 
elites. Therefore, democratization is induced when people acquire resources and values that 
enable them to put effective pressures on the elites. The authors emphasize the importance of 
self-expression values, which reflect the level of interpersonal trust, tolerance and political 
activism.  
Our work is related to that of Welzel and Inglehart (2008) to the extent that we also study 
democratization from the demand perspective. However, we focus on more direct measures of 
the demand for democracy: people’s attitudes towards democracy and demand for an 
authoritarian leader. In fact, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) discarded these measures because in 
Albania and Azerbaijan the percentage of people expressing favorable attitudes towards 
democracy was higher than in Sweden and Switzerland. We overcome this problem by applying 
fixed effects regressions for data analysis. Consequently, we do not focus on cross-country 
differences, but on the dynamics of the democracy measures within the countries. We expect 
to find that better attitudes towards democracy and lower demand for an authoritarian leader 
would increase the actual level of democracy; however, our estimates reveal a more 
complicated relationship. 
Data and methodology 
We analyze data from 70 countries. The period of analysis is 1996-2019. All variables that we 
use in our analysis and their sources are summarized in Table 4 in the Appendix. Table 5 
presents definitions of the variables. 
In order to construct our dependent variable, we use the data on Voice & Accountability 
provided by Worldwide Governance Indicators. According to its definition, this variable 
captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
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selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media. We consider these data a measure of democracy. This variable is aggregated from a 
few sources, such as the Democracy Index, calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
confidence in the honesty of elections, press freedom index, etc. Larger values correspond to 
stronger democratic institutions. Despite the time range of this variable is 1996-2019, there are 
no observations for 1997, 1999 and 2001. In most of our regressions, we linearly interpolated 
these data using 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002 observations. As a robustness check, we also 
provide regression outputs with no interpolated observations.  
By definition, Voice & Accountability takes values between -2.5 and 2.5. This resembles the 
property of probabilities, which are bounded in the [0,1] interval. To reflect this fact, 
probabilities are usually modeled employing logit transformation: log(p/(1-p)). We transform 
our dependent variable in a similar way. Our dependent variable Y is defined as 𝑌 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 .. , 
where VA denotes Voice & Accountability. This transformation is strictly increasing: larger 
values of Voice & Accountability correspond to larger Y. As a robustness check, we also 
estimate a linear model, with no transformation. 
In order to construct a dependent variable, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) used Freedom House’s 
democracy index and, after rescaling, multiplied it by the control of corruption index provided 
by Worldwide Governance Indicators. They argued that widespread corruption reduces a 
government’s responsiveness to its citizens’ needs and that the democracy index provided by 
Freedom House does not account for this factor. In our case, there is no need to perform this 
operation, as our dependent variable is already highly correlated with the control of corruption. 
The correlation between Voice & Accountability and the control of corruption index is 0.849. 
Another advantage of Voice & Accountability over the Freedom House democracy index is that 
the historical data are easily available, which allow for performing panel data econometric 
analysis and simplify the replication of the results.  
We use two questions from the World Values Survey (Inglehart et al. 2014, Haerpfer 2020) in 
our analysis. Not knowing in advance which has the stronger predictive power as an 
explanatory variable, we study both.  
Respondents are asked their opinion about a democratic system, described as very good, fairly 
good, fairly bad, or very bad (question Q238). They may also reply that they do not know, or 
offer no response. We define the variable as `support for democracy’ summing the percentage 
of respondents who reply that the democratic system is very good and fairly good.  
In addition, respondents are asked whether it is good to have a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with a parliament or elections (question Q235). The definition of such a strong 
leader is in line with the definition of an authoritarian leader in classical personalistic 
dictatorships (Geddes et al. 2018). Therefore, we consider the terms `strong leader’ and 
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`authoritarian leader’ synonyms. Again, we sum the shares of respondents who reply that 
having a strong leader is very good or fairly good. We call this variable `support for a strong 
leader’. We expect that this variable approximates the demand for an authoritarian leader. 
There is a moderate negative correlation between the support for a strong leader and demand 
for democracy: -0.197. 
We have data from 5 waves of the WVS: 1994-1998, 1999-2004, 2005-2009, 2010-2014, and 
2017-2020. The time range of the waves is rather broad: 4-5 years. In order to match these data 
with the other datasets, we suppose that these data correspond to one year before the end of 
the wave, i.e. 1997, 2003, 2008, 2013, and 2019. As we assign the date closer to the end of the 
periods, the variables obtained from the WVS, on average, lag slightly behind our dependent 
variable from the same year. However, as the surveys were implemented during the last years 
of the waves in a number of countries, our results are Granger-causal (Granger 1969) only if we 
take explanatory variables with lags greater or equal to 2 years. 
Furthermore, we control for two economic variables: GDP per capita in constant prices PPP and 
oil rents, which are defined as the difference between the value of crude oil production at 
world prices and total costs of production. Both variables come from the World Bank 
Development Indicators (WDI).  
Our dataset constitutes an unbalanced panel of 70 countries, with 5 time periods. At the time 
of writing, the data on oil rents in 2019 was not available. Therefore, when including this 
variable in our model, the year 2019 drops from the analysis, leaving us with 4 time periods. 
The year 2019 also drops out when we analyze lagged data. Thus, our panel can be viewed as 
“large N, small T”. In such cases, the standard fixed effects estimator is consistent even in the 
presence of the unit root in the residuals (Wooldridge 2002, chapter 7).  
Cross-country differences in the level of democracy may be due to diverse cultures, history, 
religion, and myriad other factors. We do not aim to describe all of them, but focus instead on 
the `within’ effects: the dynamics of a country’s level of democracy, not its absolute level. 
Therefore, we apply a standard `within’ estimator with fixed individual (country-specific) and 
time effects.  
The Breusch-Godfrey (Breusch 1978, Godfrey 1978) test for serial correlations in residuals 
rejects the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 5% significance level in all our models. 
Therefore, we present robust standard errors of the Arellano type (Arellano 1987). The use of 
robust standard errors also allows for possible heteroscedasticity in the data.  
 
Results 
Models 1-4 in Table 1, present estimates of contemporaneous models. In model 1, we regress 
logit-transformed Voice & Accountability on support for democracy. In model 2, we add 
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support for a strong leader to the regression. In models 3 and 4, we add the logarithm of the 
GDP per capita and rents from oil. In all the models, support for democracy is negative and 
significant at the 5% significance level. This result is rather counterintuitive: more positive 
sentiments towards democracy are associated with a lower level of democracy. It is possible 
that increases in the support for democracy lead to a repressive reaction in the authoritarian 
regimes: `a tightening of the screws’, as occurs in Russia (Shevtsova 2012, Sakwa 2015, Østbø 
2017).  
In democratic countries, declines in the demand for democracy may lead to even more 
freedom. Noting that societal support for democracy is in decline, democratic regimes aim to 
strengthen their values as a legacy to future generations. For example, near the end of his 
mandate, American president Barack Obama issued a directive that public schools allow 
transgender students to use restrooms corresponding to their gender identity (Kogan 2017, 
Jones 2018, Colliver & Coyle 2020). This directive was later rescinded by President Trump. 
However, this finding is not free of endogeneity problems. Reverse causality may also occur: 
during times when the level of democracy in a country declines, people may assign greater 
importance to democratic values than they did when the level of democracy was higher. 
Nevertheless, in the next section, we will show that this result is also Granger-causal.               
                                                            [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Greater rents from oil are associated with a lower level of democracy in a country. This result is 
in line with the literature discussed in the introduction. The other variables do not have a 
statistically significant impact. 
In order to resolve the endogeneity problems, it is possible to take independent variables with 
lags, as per Granger causality (Granger 1969). In models 5-7, we re-estimate models 1-4 with 
independent variables taken with a 6-year lag. Support for democracy changes its sign and 
becomes insignificant. The coefficients corresponding to support for a strong leader are 
negative and significant at the 5% significance level: greater support for an authoritarian leader, 
reflected by WVS, is associated with a lower level of democracy in 6 years. Rents from oil 
preserved their negative and highly significant coefficient. The logarithm of GDP per capita 
remained insignificant. 
It is important to mention that R2 and R2-adjusted are low in our models because we used plm 
package for programming language R which underestimates the coefficients of determination 
in comparison to similar procedures in Stata and other programming languages.2 






In Table 2 we check the robustness of our results. The first two columns are similar to columns 
4 and 8 from Table 1; however, instead of logit-transformed dependent variable, we use the 
linear functional form. In general, the results are similar to those in Table 1. 
                                                    [Insert Table 2 here] 
 
In columns 3-4, we estimate the same models as 4 and 8 in Table 1, but with no linear 
interpolation of the dependent variable in years 1997, 1999, and 2001. Results are similar. 
In the last two columns we estimate the models, excluding OECD countries from the sample. 
I.e. estimation was made on the subsample of developing countries. Again, the results are 
similar to those presented in Table 1. Unfortunately, the number of observations for OECD 
countries is rather small and thus insufficient to obtain reliable econometric estimates for this 
subset of countries. 
Lags 
In Tables 1 and 2, we present estimates of contemporaneous links between respondents’ 
attitudes towards democracy and strong leaders, and the actual level of democracy measured 
by Voice & Accountability. Furthermore, 6-years lags were analyzed. However, it is also 
interesting to analyze shorter lags.  For this reason, we estimated regressions (similar to models 
4 and 8 in Table 1) with lags of 0-6 order. Due to the construction of our regressors, only 
regressions with lags greater or equal to 2 may be referred to Granger causality: past values of 
the respondents’ attitudes towards democracy contain information that helps predict the 
actual level of democracy. 
                                                         [Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
The corresponding coefficients are presented in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 presents the 
coefficients corresponding to the `support for democracy’ variable. The coefficients increase 
with the lag: they are negative and, for the most part, significant at the 10% significance levels 
for lags 0-2. Note that the second lag provides us with Granger-causal results. Lags 3-6 
correspond to the coefficients insignificantly different from zero, but there is an upward 
tendency. Whether they turn positive and statistically significant for lags greater or equal to 7 is 
interesting; however, we cannot analyze such large lags because of the insufficient number of 
observations.  
In Figure 2 we depict the coefficient corresponding to the support for a strong leader. The 
coefficients decline when the order of lag grows. However, the coefficients are insignificant for 
all lags apart from the 6-year lag. This indicates that if the demand for an authoritarian leader 
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declines, the actual democratization of a country is far from immediate. In the best case, a 6-
year horizon can be expected. 
                                                     [Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In fact, the actual time period between a change in the demand for democracy and actual 
democratization may be even longer. This comes from the fact that the intervals between the 
waves of the World Values Survey are relatively large: 6-7 years. If the 2017-2020 wave 
indicates a decline in the demand for an authoritarian leader compared to the 2010-2014 wave, 
our empirical model assumes that this change happened at the time of the more recent wave. 
However, the actual change may have occurred earlier, in 2015, for example. Therefore, it is 
likely that our model underestimates the period needed for democratization. 
The long gap between the decline in the demand for an authoritarian leader and real 
democratization could be a demotivating factor for civil societies struggling for human rights in 
authoritarian countries. But, as our models are symmetric for declines and growths in the 
demand for authoritarian leaders, if demand for an authoritarian leader increases, actual 
autocratization is likely to follow after a substantial period of time.  
Forecasts 
Table 3 presents changes in the support for authoritarian leaders in most countries under 
analysis. These changes are calculated as the difference between the support for an 
authoritarian leader between the waves 2010-2014 and 2017-2020. Only those countries 
present in both waves are analyzed. Positive values indicate an increase in the support for an 
authoritarian leader, which can be translated into a future decline in democracy. The strongest 
effect is expected in Thailand, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Georgia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Nigeria and the Philippines.  
                                                         [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Belarus is also in the risk zone. Support for an authoritarian leader increased by 15 per cent 
during the analyzed period: from 47 to 62 per cent. This change is somewhat counterintuitive 
as it is not in line with the large-scale protests against the Belarusian autocrat A. Lukashenko 
beginning in the second half of 2020. One possible explanation for this inconsistency is that the 
survey (WVS) in Belarus took place in February-March 2018. While in 2020, during presidential 
elections, public opinion may have changed. Buzgalin & Kolganov (2020) estimated that in the 
initial phase of the Belarusian protests opposition to Lukashenko constituted 15-20 per cent of 
population. These antagonists were, however, very active, while at the same time, the regime’s 
response was inadequate. As a result, the opposition won the information war. Protests in 
Belarus today are, for the most part, directed against the current president A. Lukashenko and 
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not against the authoritarian regime in general. Many Belarusian protesters do not wish to join 
the EU or NATO, and may even have pro-Putin sentiments (Menon 2020).  
The steepest decline in the demand for an authoritarian leader is observed in Egypt, Russia, 
Tunisia, Kyrgyz Republic and Spain. Our models predict that after some period of time, the 
actual level of democracy, measured by Voice & Accountability, will rise in these countries.  
Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyzed the links between agents’ attitudes towards democracy and towards 
an authoritarian leader, and the actual level of democracy. We showed that in the short run (0-
2 years), the relationship between the agents’ attitudes towards democracy and the actual level 
of democracy is negative. However, no long-term consequences of the changes in agents’ 
attitudes towards democracy were observed. Agents’ demand for an authoritarian leader, on 
the contrary, has no significant impact in the short run. However, we find it has a significant 
impact on the democracy level if taken with 6-year lag: a lower demand for an authoritarian 
leader is associated with a greater level of democracy. As we argue in the text, large intervals 
between the waves in the WVS can make the actual lag even longer. 
In many countries, e.g., Thailand, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Georgia, Malaysia, South Korea, 
Nigeria and the Philippines demand for an authoritarian leader is increasing; this may worsen 
the positions of these countries in the democracy ratings. At the same time, in Egypt, Russia, 
Tunisia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Spain, demand for an authoritarian leader is declining. Our 
analysis predicts that, after a time, the democracy level in these countries is likely to rise. 
Future analysis may focus on more homogenous groups of countries such as the CIS, sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America, South-East Asia, etc. Such works could provide more detailed, 
region-specific estimates and predictions and provide analysis not only of the `within country’ 
dynamics of democracy, but also cross-country differences. Today, the number of observations 
provided by the WVS is insufficient for such tasks; however, future waves of the survey may 
give researchers the opportunity to overcome these limitations. Another promising extension 
of our research could be the application of a model that allows for the asymmetric effects of 
increases and declines in the demand for democracy. 
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Table 1. Fixed effects, dependent variable: Voice & accountability 
 Contemporaneous models Lag = 6 years 













































   -0.0212***  
(0.0067) 
   -0.0158*** 
(0.0050) 
R2 0.0319 0.0413 0.0449 0.0602 0.0001 0.0378 0.0391 0.0884 
N 275 268 265 192 201 197 194 191 






Table 2. Fixed effects, dependent variable: Voice & accountability, or its transformation 
 Linear functional form No dependent 
variable interpolation 
Developing countries 

























































R2 0.0938 0.0656 0.2037 0.1772 0.1129 0.0840 
N 191 191 151 151 103 103 





Table 3. Change in strong leader support between the last two waves: 2010-2014 and 2017-
2020 
Increase in strong leader 
support 
Small change in strong leader 
support 
Decline in strong leader 
support 
THA 0.58 CHL 0.06 BRA -0.08 
AZE 0.45 JOR 0.06 EST -0.13 
IRQ 0.32 ARM 0.05 UKR -0.13 
ZWE 0.22 NLD 0.05 LBN -0.14 
GEO 0.19 TWN 0.05 ESP -0.17 
MYS 0.19 AUS 0.04 KGZ -0.2 
KOR 0.18 ECU 0.04 TUN -0.21 
NGA 0.18 SVN 0.04 RUS -0.27 
PHL 0.16 USA 0.04 EGY -0.66 
BLR 0.15 KAZ 0.04   
ARG 0.12 ROU 0.02   
MEX 0.12 PAK 0.01   
CYP 0.11 DEU -0.01   
PER 0.11 HKG -0.02   
CHN 0.1 JPN -0.02   
COL 0.08 NZL -0.03   
  POL -0.04   










   









Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
 mean sd min max N Source 
Voice & 
accountability 
0.2295 0.9680 -1.9496 1.7380 370 WDI 
Support for 
democracy 
0.8279 0.0935 0.45 0.99 275 WVS 
Support for a 
strong leader 
0.3729 0.1927 0.05 0.95 271 WVS 
GDP/cap PPP 
(log) 
9.6707 0.9266 6.5769 11.0609 359 WGI 
Rents from oil 2.5522 6.4294 0 52.3647 284 WGI 
 




The variable captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
Support for 
democracy 
Percentage of respondents, who agree or strongly agree with the statement: 
“Having a democratic political system is good”. 
Support for a 
strong leader 
Percentage of respondents, who agree or strongly agree with the statement: 
“Having a strong leader, who does not have to bother with parliament and 
elections is good”. 
GDP/cap PPP 
(log) 
The natural logarithm of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international 
dollars). 
Rents from oil The difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and 
total costs of production 
 
